c911360eb5
This PR utilize the new burst limit column from projects table to allow control on the limit for request per seconds and token bucket size When no burst limit is explicitly set, rate limit is applied to both so we don't limit how quickly request can be made in a second. Change-Id: I883235c60c5d6416aeadd1c80ed2ebd193aa4d9f
330 lines
10 KiB
Go
330 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2019 Storj Labs, Inc.
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// See LICENSE for copying information.
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package metainfo
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"regexp"
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"time"
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"github.com/zeebo/errs"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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"golang.org/x/time/rate"
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"storj.io/common/encryption"
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"storj.io/common/macaroon"
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"storj.io/common/pb"
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"storj.io/common/rpc/rpcstatus"
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"storj.io/common/storj"
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"storj.io/common/uuid"
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"storj.io/storj/satellite/console"
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"storj.io/storj/satellite/console/consoleauth"
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"storj.io/storj/satellite/metabase"
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)
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var (
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ipRegexp = regexp.MustCompile(`^(([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\.){3}([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])$`)
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)
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func getAPIKey(ctx context.Context, header *pb.RequestHeader) (key *macaroon.APIKey, err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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if header != nil {
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return macaroon.ParseRawAPIKey(header.ApiKey)
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}
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keyData, ok := consoleauth.GetAPIKey(ctx)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errs.New("missing credentials")
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}
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return macaroon.ParseAPIKey(string(keyData))
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}
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// validateAuth validates things like API key, user permissions and rate limit and always returns valid rpc error.
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateAuth(ctx context.Context, header *pb.RequestHeader, action macaroon.Action) (_ *console.APIKeyInfo, err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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key, keyInfo, err := endpoint.validateBasic(ctx, header)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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err = key.Check(ctx, keyInfo.Secret, action, endpoint.revocations)
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if err != nil {
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endpoint.log.Debug("unauthorized request", zap.Error(err))
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return nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.PermissionDenied, "Unauthorized API credentials")
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}
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return keyInfo, nil
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}
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type verifyPermission struct {
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action macaroon.Action
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actionPermitted *bool
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optional bool
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}
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// validateAuthN validates things like API keys, rate limit and user permissions
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// for each permission from permissions. It returns an error for the first
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// required (not optional) permission that the check fails for. There must be at
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// least one required (not optional) permission. In case all permissions are
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// optional, it will return an error. It always returns valid RPC errors.
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateAuthN(ctx context.Context, header *pb.RequestHeader, permissions ...verifyPermission) (_ *console.APIKeyInfo, err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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allOptional := true
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for _, p := range permissions {
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if !p.optional {
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allOptional = false
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break
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}
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}
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if allOptional {
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return nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.Internal, "All permissions are optional")
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}
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key, keyInfo, err := endpoint.validateBasic(ctx, header)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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for _, p := range permissions {
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err = key.Check(ctx, keyInfo.Secret, p.action, endpoint.revocations)
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if p.actionPermitted != nil {
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*p.actionPermitted = err == nil
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}
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if err != nil && !p.optional {
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endpoint.log.Debug("unauthorized request", zap.Error(err))
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return nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.PermissionDenied, "Unauthorized API credentials")
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}
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}
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return keyInfo, nil
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}
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateBasic(ctx context.Context, header *pb.RequestHeader) (_ *macaroon.APIKey, _ *console.APIKeyInfo, err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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key, err := getAPIKey(ctx, header)
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if err != nil {
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endpoint.log.Debug("invalid request", zap.Error(err))
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return nil, nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.InvalidArgument, "Invalid API credentials")
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}
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keyInfo, err := endpoint.apiKeys.GetByHead(ctx, key.Head())
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if err != nil {
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endpoint.log.Debug("unauthorized request", zap.Error(err))
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return nil, nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.PermissionDenied, "Unauthorized API credentials")
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}
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if err = endpoint.checkRate(ctx, keyInfo.ProjectID); err != nil {
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endpoint.log.Debug("rate check failed", zap.Error(err))
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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return key, keyInfo, nil
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}
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateRevoke(ctx context.Context, header *pb.RequestHeader, macToRevoke *macaroon.Macaroon) (_ *console.APIKeyInfo, err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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key, keyInfo, err := endpoint.validateBasic(ctx, header)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// The macaroon to revoke must be valid with the same secret as the key.
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if !macToRevoke.Validate(keyInfo.Secret) {
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return nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.InvalidArgument, "Macaroon to revoke invalid")
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}
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keyTail := key.Tail()
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tails := macToRevoke.Tails(keyInfo.Secret)
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// A macaroon cannot revoke itself. So we only check len(tails-1), skipping
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// the final tail. To be valid, the final tail of the auth key must be
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// contained within the checked tails of the macaroon we want to revoke.
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for i := 0; i < len(tails)-1; i++ {
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tails[i], keyTail) == 1 {
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return keyInfo, nil
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}
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}
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return nil, rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.PermissionDenied, "Unauthorized attempt to revoke macaroon")
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}
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) checkRate(ctx context.Context, projectID uuid.UUID) (err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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if !endpoint.config.RateLimiter.Enabled {
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return nil
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}
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limiter, err := endpoint.limiterCache.Get(projectID.String(), func() (interface{}, error) {
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rateLimit := rate.Limit(endpoint.config.RateLimiter.Rate)
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burstLimit := int(endpoint.config.RateLimiter.Rate)
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project, err := endpoint.projects.Get(ctx, projectID)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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if project.RateLimit != nil {
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rateLimit = rate.Limit(*project.RateLimit)
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burstLimit = *project.RateLimit
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}
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// use the explicitly set burst value if it's defined
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if project.BurstLimit != nil {
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burstLimit = *project.BurstLimit
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}
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return rate.NewLimiter(rateLimit, burstLimit), nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.Unavailable, err.Error())
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}
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if !limiter.(*rate.Limiter).Allow() {
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endpoint.log.Warn("too many requests for project",
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zap.Stringer("projectID", projectID),
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zap.Float64("rate limit", float64(limiter.(*rate.Limiter).Limit())),
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zap.Float64("burst limit", float64(limiter.(*rate.Limiter).Burst())))
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mon.Event("metainfo_rate_limit_exceeded") //mon:locked
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return rpcstatus.Error(rpcstatus.ResourceExhausted, "Too Many Requests")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket []byte) (err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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if len(bucket) == 0 {
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return Error.Wrap(storj.ErrNoBucket.New(""))
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}
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if len(bucket) < 3 || len(bucket) > 63 {
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return Error.New("bucket name must be at least 3 and no more than 63 characters long")
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}
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// Regexp not used because benchmark shows it will be slower for valid bucket names
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// https://gist.github.com/mniewrzal/49de3af95f36e63e88fac24f565e444c
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labels := bytes.Split(bucket, []byte("."))
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for _, label := range labels {
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err = validateBucketLabel(label)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if ipRegexp.MatchString(string(bucket)) {
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return Error.New("bucket name cannot be formatted as an IP address")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validateBucketLabel(label []byte) error {
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if len(label) == 0 {
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return Error.New("bucket label cannot be empty")
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}
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if !isLowerLetter(label[0]) && !isDigit(label[0]) {
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return Error.New("bucket label must start with a lowercase letter or number")
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}
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if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
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return Error.New("bucket label cannot start or end with a hyphen")
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}
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for i := 1; i < len(label)-1; i++ {
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if !isLowerLetter(label[i]) && !isDigit(label[i]) && (label[i] != '-') && (label[i] != '.') {
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return Error.New("bucket name must contain only lowercase letters, numbers or hyphens")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func isLowerLetter(r byte) bool {
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return r >= 'a' && r <= 'z'
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}
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func isDigit(r byte) bool {
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return r >= '0' && r <= '9'
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}
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func (endpoint *Endpoint) validateRemoteSegment(ctx context.Context, commitRequest metabase.CommitSegment, originalLimits []*pb.OrderLimit) (err error) {
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defer mon.Task()(&ctx)(&err)
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if len(originalLimits) == 0 {
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return Error.New("no order limits")
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}
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if len(originalLimits) != int(commitRequest.Redundancy.TotalShares) {
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return Error.New("invalid no order limit for piece")
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}
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maxAllowed, err := encryption.CalcEncryptedSize(endpoint.config.MaxSegmentSize.Int64(), storj.EncryptionParameters{
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CipherSuite: storj.EncAESGCM,
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BlockSize: 128, // intentionally low block size to allow maximum possible encryption overhead
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if int64(commitRequest.EncryptedSize) > maxAllowed || commitRequest.EncryptedSize < 0 {
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return Error.New("encrypted segment size %v is out of range, maximum allowed is %v", commitRequest.EncryptedSize, maxAllowed)
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}
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// TODO more validation for plain size and plain offset
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if commitRequest.PlainSize > commitRequest.EncryptedSize {
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return Error.New("plain segment size %v is out of range, maximum allowed is %v", commitRequest.PlainSize, commitRequest.EncryptedSize)
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}
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pieceNums := make(map[uint16]struct{})
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nodeIds := make(map[storj.NodeID]struct{})
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for _, piece := range commitRequest.Pieces {
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if int(piece.Number) >= len(originalLimits) {
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return Error.New("invalid piece number")
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}
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limit := originalLimits[piece.Number]
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if limit == nil {
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return Error.New("empty order limit for piece")
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}
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err := endpoint.orders.VerifyOrderLimitSignature(ctx, limit)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// expect that too much time has not passed between order limit creation and now
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if time.Since(limit.OrderCreation) > endpoint.config.MaxCommitInterval {
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return Error.New("Segment not committed before max commit interval of %f minutes.", endpoint.config.MaxCommitInterval.Minutes())
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}
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derivedPieceID := commitRequest.RootPieceID.Derive(piece.StorageNode, int32(piece.Number))
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if limit.PieceId.IsZero() || limit.PieceId != derivedPieceID {
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return Error.New("invalid order limit piece id")
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}
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if piece.StorageNode != limit.StorageNodeId {
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return Error.New("piece NodeID != order limit NodeID")
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}
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if _, ok := pieceNums[piece.Number]; ok {
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return Error.New("piece num %d is duplicated", piece.Number)
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}
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if _, ok := nodeIds[piece.StorageNode]; ok {
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return Error.New("node id %s for piece num %d is duplicated", piece.StorageNode.String(), piece.Number)
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}
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pieceNums[piece.Number] = struct{}{}
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nodeIds[piece.StorageNode] = struct{}{}
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}
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return nil
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}
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