nixpkgs/pkgs/development/python-modules/cryptography/CVE-2020-25659.patch
adisbladis cbe4b091b8
python2.pkgs.cryptography: Fix CVE-2020-25659
This patch is from Ubuntu 20.04's backport.
2020-12-04 11:29:50 +01:00

77 lines
3.0 KiB
Diff

Backported of:
From 58494b41d6ecb0f56b7c5f05d5f5e3ca0320d494 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 21:16:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Attempt to mitigate Bleichenbacher attacks on RSA decryption
(#5507)
diff --git a/docs/spelling_wordlist.txt b/docs/spelling_wordlist.txt
index 6e4675d..ce66c28 100644
--- a/docs/spelling_wordlist.txt
+++ b/docs/spelling_wordlist.txt
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ backend
Backends
backends
bcrypt
+Bleichenbacher
Blowfish
boolean
Botan
diff --git a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/rsa.py b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/rsa.py
index 3e4c2fd..6303f95 100644
--- a/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/rsa.py
+++ b/src/cryptography/hazmat/backends/openssl/rsa.py
@@ -117,40 +117,19 @@ def _enc_dec_rsa_pkey_ctx(backend, key, data, padding_enum, padding):
outlen = backend._ffi.new("size_t *", buf_size)
buf = backend._ffi.new("unsigned char[]", buf_size)
+ # Everything from this line onwards is written with the goal of being as
+ # constant-time as is practical given the constraints of Python and our
+ # API. See Bleichenbacher's '98 attack on RSA, and its many many variants.
+ # As such, you should not attempt to change this (particularly to "clean it
+ # up") without understanding why it was written this way (see
+ # Chesterton's Fence), and without measuring to verify you have not
+ # introduced observable time differences.
res = crypt(pkey_ctx, buf, outlen, data, len(data))
+ resbuf = backend._ffi.buffer(buf)[: outlen[0]]
+ backend._lib.ERR_clear_error()
if res <= 0:
- _handle_rsa_enc_dec_error(backend, key)
-
- return backend._ffi.buffer(buf)[:outlen[0]]
-
-
-def _handle_rsa_enc_dec_error(backend, key):
- errors = backend._consume_errors()
- backend.openssl_assert(errors)
- backend.openssl_assert(errors[0].lib == backend._lib.ERR_LIB_RSA)
- if isinstance(key, _RSAPublicKey):
- backend.openssl_assert(
- errors[0].reason == backend._lib.RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE
- )
- raise ValueError(
- "Data too long for key size. Encrypt less data or use a "
- "larger key size."
- )
- else:
- decoding_errors = [
- backend._lib.RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01,
- backend._lib.RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02,
- backend._lib.RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR,
- # Though this error looks similar to the
- # RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE, this occurs on decrypts,
- # rather than on encrypts
- backend._lib.RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS,
- ]
- if backend._lib.Cryptography_HAS_RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR:
- decoding_errors.append(backend._lib.RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR)
-
- backend.openssl_assert(errors[0].reason in decoding_errors)
- raise ValueError("Decryption failed.")
+ raise ValueError("Encryption/decryption failed.")
+ return resbuf
def _rsa_sig_determine_padding(backend, key, padding, algorithm):