libbrotli wasn't listed as a dependency for the AppArmor profile of the transmission-daemon binary.
As a result, transmission wouldn't run and would fail, logging this audit message to dmesg:
audit[11595]: AVC apparmor=DENIED operation=open profile=/nix/store/08i1rmakmnpwyxpvp0sfc5hcm106am7w-transmission-3.00/bin/transmission-daemon name=/proc/11595/environ pid=11595 comm=transmission-da requested_mask=r denied_mask=r fsuid=70 ouid=70
This reverts commit d9e18f4e7f.
This change is broken, since it doesn't configure the proper database
username in keycloak when provisioning a local database with a custom
username. Its intended behavior is also potentially confusing and
dangerous, so rather than fixing it, let's revert to the old one.
Follow RFC 42 by having a settings option that is
then converted into an unbound configuration file
instead of having an extraConfig option.
Existing options have been renamed or kept if
possible.
An enableRemoteAccess has been added. It sets remote-control setting to
true in unbound.conf which in turn enables the new wrapping of
unbound-control to access the server locally. Also includes options
'remoteAccessInterfaces' and 'remoteAccessPort' for remote access.
Signed-off-by: Marc 'risson' Schmitt <marc.schmitt@risson.space>
The reap function culls expired pastes outside of the process serving
the pastes. Previously the database could accumulate a large number of
pastes and while they were expired they would not be deleted unless
accessed from the frontend.
Individual settings would previously overwrite the whole config, but
now individual values can be overwritten.
Fix missing slash to make the database path an absolute path per
https://docs.sqlalchemy.org/en/14/core/engines.html#sqlite.
Drop preferred_lexers, it's not set to anything meaningful anyway.
Home-assistant through its `--runner` commandline flag supports sending
exit code 100 when the `homeassistant.restart` service is called.
With `RestartForceExitStatus` we can listen for that specific exit code
and restart the whole systemd unit, providing an actual clean restart
with fresh processes. Additional treat exit code 100 as a successful
termination.
This is what is still exposed, and it should still allow things to work
as usual.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's … 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET… Service may allocate Internet soc… 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with som… 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP add… 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to… 0.2
✗ PrivateUsers= Service has access to other users 0.2
✗ SystemCallFilter=~@resources System call allow list defined fo… 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's ro… 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary g… 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for home-assistant.service: 1.6 OK :-)
This can grow to as much as ~1.9 if you use one of the bluetooth or nmap
trackers or the emulated_hue component, all of which required elevated
permisssions.
Postfix has started outputting an error on startup that it can't parse
the compatibility level 9999.
Instead, just set the compatibility level to be identical to the current
version, which seems to be the (new) intent for the compatibility level.
- In order to use GIO/GVFS it is enough to enable the gvfs service.
- The module option services.gvfs.package can be used to choose a
variation of the gvfs package, if desired.
Fixes these two deprecation warnings, by moving away from these options
towards a simple listener configuration.
> The 'bind_address' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. The behaviour will default to true.
> The 'port' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. Please use 'listener' instead.
Fixes: #120860
It can still network, it can only access the ssl related files if ssl is
enabled.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for mosquitto.service: 1.1 OK 🙂
This ensures that newly created secrets will have the permissions
`0640`. With this change it's ensured that no sensitive information will
be word-readable at any time.
Related to #121293.
Strictly speaking this is a breaking change since each new directory
(including data-files) aren't world-readable anymore, but actually these
shouldn't be, unless there's a good reason for it.
This is what is still exposed, and it allows me to control my lamps from
within home-assistant.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to hardware devices 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary groups 0.1
✗ MemoryDenyWriteExecute= Service may create writable executable memory mappings 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for zigbee2mqtt.service: 1.3 OK 🙂
Until now, the `touch + chmod 600 + write` approach made it possible for
an unprivileged local user read the private key file, by opening
the file after the touch, before the read permissions are restricted.
This was only the case if `generatePrivateKeyFile = true` and the parent
directory of `privateKeyFile` already existed and was readable.
This commit fixes it by using `umask`, which ensures kernel-side that
the `touch` creates the file with the correct permissions atomically.
This commit also:
* Removes `mkdir --mode 0644 -p "${dirOf values.privateKeyFile}"`
because setting permissions `drw-r--r--` ("nobody can enter that dir")
is awkward. `drwx------` would perhaps make sense, like for `.ssh`.
However, setting the permissions on the private key file is enough,
and likely better, because `privateKeyFile` is about that file
specifically and no docs suggest that there's something special
about its parent dir.
* Removes the `chmod 0400 "${values.privateKeyFile}"`
because there isn't really a point in removing write access from
the owner of the private key.
- Set an explicit umask that allows u+rwx and g+r.
- Adds `ProtectControlGroups` and `ProtectKernelLogs`, there should be
no need to access either.
- Adds `ProtectClock` to prevent write-access to the system clock.
- `ProtectProc` hides processes from other users within the /proc
filesystem and `ProcSubSet` hides all files/directories unrelated to
the process management of the units process.
- Sets `RemoveIPC`, as there is no SysV or POSIX IPC within nginx that I
know of.
- Restricts the creation of arbitrary namespaces
- Adds a reasonable `SystemCallFilter` preventing calls to @privileged,
@obsolete and others.
And finally applies some sorting based on the order these options appear
in systemd.exec(5).
