For imports, it is better to use ‘modulesPath’ than rely on <nixpkgs>
being correctly set. Some users may not have <nixpkgs> set correctly.
In addition, when ‘pure-eval=true’, <nixpkgs> is unset.
Context: discussion in https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/82630
Mesa has been supporting S3TC natively without requiring these libraries
since the S3TC patent expired in December 2017.
Shimming out the Let's Encrypt domain name to reuse client configuration
doesn't work properly (Pebble uses different endpoint URL formats), is
recommended against by upstream,[1] and is unnecessary now that the ACME
module supports specifying an ACME server. This commit changes the tests
to use the domain name acme.test instead, and renames the letsencrypt
node to acme to reflect that it has nothing to do with the ACME server
that Let's Encrypt runs. The imports are renamed for clarity:
* nixos/tests/common/{letsencrypt => acme}/{common.nix => client}
* nixos/tests/common/{letsencrypt => acme}/{default.nix => server}
The test's other domain names are also adjusted to use *.test for
consistency (and to avoid misuse of non-reserved domain names such
as standalone.com).
[1] https://github.com/letsencrypt/pebble/issues/283#issuecomment-545123242
Co-authored-by: Yegor Timoshenko <yegortimoshenko@riseup.net>
This was added in aade4e577b, but the
implementation of the ACME module has been entirely rewritten since
then, and the test seems to run fine on AArch64.
These now depend on an external patch set; add them to the release tests
to ensure that the build doesn't break silently as new kernel updates
are merged.
linux-hardened sets kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 by default; see
anthraxx/linux-hardened@104f44058f.
This allows the Nix sandbox to function while reducing the attack
surface posed by user namespaces, which allow unprivileged code to
exercise lots of root-only code paths and have lead to privilege
escalation vulnerabilities in the past.
We can safely leave user namespaces on for privileged users, as root
already has root privileges, but if you're not running builds on your
machine and really want to minimize the kernel attack surface then you
can set security.allowUserNamespaces to false.
Note that Chrome's sandbox requires either unprivileged CLONE_NEWUSER or
setuid, and Firefox's silently reduces the security level if it isn't
allowed (see about:support), so desktop users may want to set:
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone" = true;
* nixos/k3s: simplify config expression
* nixos/k3s: add config assertions and trim unneeded bits
* nixos/k3s: add a test that k3s works; minor module improvements
This is a single-node test. Eventually we should also have a multi-node
test to verify the agent bit works, but that one's more involved.
* nixos/k3s: add option description
* nixos/k3s: add defaults for token/serveraddr
Now that the assertion enforces their presence, we dont' need to use the typesystem for it.
* nixos/k3s: remove unneeded sudo in test
* nixos/k3s: add to test list
systemd-tmpfiles will load all files in lexicographic order and ignores rules
for the same path in later files with a warning Since we apply the default rules
provided by systemd, we should load user-defines rules first so users have a
chance to override defaults.
