common-config.nix has:
${kernelPlatform.kernelExtraConfig or ""}
and indeed kernelExtraConfig is in hostPlatform.platform, and not in
hostPlatform. (Ugh.).
- defined buildLinux as generic.nix instead of manual-config.nix. This
makes kernel derivations a tad more similar to your typical derivations.
- moved $buildRoot to within the source folder, this way it doesn't have to be created before the unpackPhase
and make it easier to work on kernel source without running the unpackPhase
[...]
make modules -C /nix/store/h1vzl6bq4wif3m8dd1bw2p3fv4shjg3n-linux-4.14.9-dev/lib/modules/4.14.9/build EXTRA_CFLAGS=-Werror-implicit-function-declaration M=/tmp/nix-build-spl-kernel-2017-11-16-4.14.9.drv-0/source/build
/nix/store/h1vzl6bq4wif3m8dd1bw2p3fv4shjg3n-linux-4.14.9-dev/lib/modules/4.14.9/source/Makefile:939: *** "Cannot generate ORC metadata for CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC=y, please install libelf-dev, libelf-devel or elfutils-libelf-devel". Stop.
This patch introduces kernel.moduleBuildDependencies to avoid the logic "stdenv.lib.optional (stdenv.lib.versionAtLeast kernel.version "4.14") libelf" in multiple places.
[dezgeg did some minor tweaks on top]
Built successfully on x86_64-linux.
I've verified the contents of the tarball by comparing its contents
against the tag of my local checkout. Furthermore, I've checked the GPG
signature of the tag.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
Built successfully on x86_64-linux.
I've verified the contents of the tarball by comparing its contents
against the tag of my local checkout. Furthermore, I've checked the GPG
signature of the tag.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
Built successfully on x86_64-linux.
I've verified the contents of the tarball by comparing its contents
against the tag of my local checkout. Furthermore, I've checked the GPG
signature of the tag.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
Certain tools, e.g. compilers, are customarily prefixed with the name of
their target platform so that multiple builds can be used at once
without clobbering each other on the PATH. I was using identifiers named
`prefix` for this purpose, but that conflicts with the standard use of
`prefix` to mean the directory where something is installed. To avoid
conflict and confusion, I renamed those to `targetPrefix`.
With this disabled, cameras would not get a `/dev/mediaX` entry matching
the `/dev/videoX` which broke any application (e.g: `uvcdynctrl -l`,
`media-ctl -p`) depending on this interface.
Currently, moving to kernel_4_14 breaks at least Intel Wireless 8260 and
8265 cards due to a API change in the firmware, which is not yet honored
in the driver.
I needed to override some parameters because of an error I had:
"Error: modDirVersion specified in the Nix expression is wrong, it should be: 4.9.60+"
but the following override would not be taken into account
pkg.override ({
modDirVersion="4.9.60+";
src=pkgs.lib.cleanSource /home/teto/mptcp;
})
because the override would be overriden by the nixpkgs parameters
because of concatenation order:
https://nixos.org/nix/manual/#sec-language-operators
For a while now, the only thing the 'uboot' attribute does is to tell
whether to add ubootTools to kernel/initrd builds. That can be
determined with platform.kernelTarget == "uImage" just as well.
* master: (81 commits)
Add NixOS 17.09 AMIs
gradle: 4.2 -> 4.2.1
maintainers.nix: use my GitHub handle as maintainer name
fcitx-engines.rime: init at 0.3.2
brise: init at 2017-09-16
librime: init at 1.2.9
marisa: init at 0.2.4
opencc: build shared library and programs
josm: 12712 -> 12914
exa: 0.7.0 -> 0.8.0
krb5: add deprecation date for old configuration
rustRegistry: 2017-09-10 -> 2017-10-03
go-ethereum: Fix libusb segmentation faults on Darwin
tor-browser-bundle-bin: 7.0.5 -> 7.0.6
libsodium: 1.0.13 -> 1.0.15
tor-browser-bundle: geoip support
tor-browser-bundle: support transports obfs2,obfs3
tor-browser-bundle: bump https-everywhere to 2017.9.12
tint2: limit platforms to Linux since macOS is not supported and fails the tests
eclipse-plugin-vrapper: init at 0.72.0
...
Since we don't have a split debug info output yet, don't waste time
writing several gigabytes of debug info that's all going to be stripped
out at the end.
This change only affects Aarch64 (where some joker has enabled it in the
architecture defconfig) and is a no-op on the others.
There is no maintainer for this package, probably not many users.
It requires effort to fix all third-party modules for this old kernel
versions. It might contain unpatched security holes.
For Pixel chromebooks, we have the samus-kernel.
Apart from that https://github.com/GalliumOS/linux might be a good choice.
Note
- the kernel config parser ignores "# foo is unset" comments so they
have no effect; disabling kernel modules would break *everything* and so
is ill-suited for a general-purpose kernel anyway --- the hardened nixos
profile provides a more flexible solution
- removed some overlap with the common config (SECCOMP is *required* by systemd;
YAMA is enabled by default).
- MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL is guarded by EXPERT on vanilla so setting it to y breaks
the build; fix by making it optional
- restored some original comments which I feel are clearer
Tested via building the linux_testing attribute, but didn't test it at
runtime (yet).
Diffed unpacked tarball against my local git clone and the contents
match.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
starting with linux 4.12 our patch no longer applied. In order to
avoid having to maintain patches for different linux kernels it is
easier to use a wrapper instead.
There's an upstream build failure on ARM (not directly related to Xen
but rather some other config options it enables). The xen package is
x86_64-only anyways.
XSA-216 Issue Description:
> The block interface response structure has some discontiguous fields.
> Certain backends populate the structure fields of an otherwise
> uninitialized instance of this structure on their stacks, leaking
> data through the (internal or trailing) padding field.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-216.html
XSA-217 Issue Description:
> Domains controlling other domains are permitted to map pages owned by
> the domain being controlled. If the controlling domain unmaps such a
> page without flushing the TLB, and if soon after the domain being
> controlled transfers this page to another PV domain (via
> GNTTABOP_transfer or, indirectly, XENMEM_exchange), and that third
> domain uses the page as a page table, the controlling domain will have
> write access to a live page table until the applicable TLB entry is
> flushed or evicted. Note that the domain being controlled is
> necessarily HVM, while the controlling domain is PV.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-217.html
XSA-218 Issue Description:
> We have discovered two bugs in the code unmapping grant references.
>
> * When a grant had been mapped twice by a backend domain, and then
> unmapped by two concurrent unmap calls, the frontend may be informed
> that the page had no further mappings when the first call completed rather
> than when the second call completed.
>
> * A race triggerable by an unprivileged guest could cause a grant
> maptrack entry for grants to be "freed" twice. The ultimate effect of
> this would be for maptrack entries for a single domain to be re-used.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-218.html
XSA-219 Issue Description:
> When using shadow paging, writes to guest pagetables must be trapped and
> emulated, so the shadows can be suitably adjusted as well.
>
> When emulating the write, Xen maps the guests pagetable(s) to make the final
> adjustment and leave the guest's view of its state consistent.
>
> However, when mapping the frame, Xen drops the page reference before
> performing the write. This is a race window where the underlying frame can
> change ownership.
>
> One possible attack scenario is for the frame to change ownership and to be
> inserted into a PV guest's pagetables. At that point, the emulated write will
> be an unaudited modification to the PV pagetables whose value is under guest
> control.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-219.html
XSA-220 Issue Description:
> Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) and Protection Key (PKU) are features in
> newer processors, whose state is intended to be per-thread and context
> switched along with all other XSAVE state.
>
> Xen's vCPU context switch code would save and restore the state only
> if the guest had set the relevant XSTATE enable bits. However,
> surprisingly, the use of these features is not dependent (PKU) or may
> not be dependent (MPX) on having the relevant XSTATE bits enabled.
>
> VMs which use MPX or PKU, and context switch the state manually rather
> than via XSAVE, will have the state leak between vCPUs (possibly,
> between vCPUs in different guests). This in turn corrupts state in
> the destination vCPU, and hence may lead to weakened protections
>
> Experimentally, MPX appears not to make any interaction with BND*
> state if BNDCFGS.EN is set but XCR0.BND{CSR,REGS} are clear. However,
> the SDM is not clear in this case; therefore MPX is included in this
> advisory as a precaution.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-220.html
XSA-221 Issue Description:
> When polling event channels, in general arbitrary port numbers can be
> specified. Specifically, there is no requirement that a polled event
> channel ports has ever been created. When the code was generalised
> from an earlier implementation, introducing some intermediate
> pointers, a check should have been made that these intermediate
> pointers are non-NULL. However, that check was omitted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html
XSA-222 Issue Description:
> Certain actions require removing pages from a guest's P2M
> (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map
> guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may
> incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual
> smaller ones). If this allocation fails, these errors are ignored by
> the callers, which would then continue and (for example) free the
> referenced page for reuse. This leaves the guest with a mapping to a
> page it shouldn't have access to.
>
> The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
> when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
> fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
> this pool is exhausted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-222.html
XSA-224 Issue Description:
> We have discovered a number of bugs in the code mapping and unmapping
> grant references.
>
> * If a grant is mapped with both the GNTMAP_device_map and
> GNTMAP_host_map flags, but unmapped only with host_map, the device_map
> portion remains but the page reference counts are lowered as though it
> had been removed. This bug can be leveraged cause a page's reference
> counts and type counts to fall to zero while retaining writeable
> mappings to the page.
>
> * Under some specific conditions, if a grant is mapped with both the
> GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map flags, the operation may not
> grab sufficient type counts. When the grant is then unmapped, the
> type count will be erroneously reduced. This bug can be leveraged
> cause a page's reference counts and type counts to fall to zero while
> retaining writeable mappings to the page.
>
> * When a grant reference is given to an MMIO region (as opposed to a
> normal guest page), if the grant is mapped with only the
> GNTMAP_device_map flag set, a mapping is created at host_addr anyway.
> This does *not* cause reference counts to change, but there will be no
> record of this mapping, so it will not be considered when reporting
> whether the grant is still in use.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html
