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chromium: Update all channels to latest versions.

Browse Source 
This introduces version 31.0.1650.57 as the new version for the stable
channel.

Overview of the updated channels:

stable: 30.0.1599.114 -> 31.0.1650.57
beta:   31.0.1650.34  -> 32.0.1700.19
dev:    32.0.1671.3   -> 33.0.1712.4

This drops the sandbox_userns_30.patch as version 30 is no longer
stable. In addition, we had to patch out some references to /usr/bin/gcc
in the bundled WebKit sources.

Builds are passing and running fine.

Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
This commit is contained in:
aszlig 2013-11-22 16:28:30 +01:00
parent d809fd135f
commit da62e513e7
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: D0EBD0EC8C2DC961
3 changed files with 16 additions and 308 deletions
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13
pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/default.nix
View File

@ -46,16 +46,17 @@ let
prePatch = "patchShebangs .";
patches = singleton (
if versionOlder version "31.0.0.0"
then ./sandbox_userns_30.patch
else ./sandbox_userns_31.patch
);
patches = singleton ./sandbox_userns_31.patch;
postPatch = ''
sed -i -r -e 's/-f(stack-protector)(-all)?/-fno-\1/' build/common.gypi
'' + (if versionOlder version "32.0.0.0" then ''
sed -i -e 's|/usr/bin/gcc|gcc|' third_party/WebKit/Source/core/core.gypi
'' + optionalString useOpenSSL ''
'' else ''
sed -i -e 's|/usr/bin/gcc|gcc|' \
third_party/WebKit/Source/build/scripts/scripts.gypi \
third_party/WebKit/Source/build/scripts/preprocessor.pm
'') + optionalString useOpenSSL ''
cat $opensslPatches | patch -p1 -d third_party/openssl/openssl
'';

293
pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/sandbox_userns_30.patch
View File

@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
commit 41510de6ae32e6161073992bd1243f7f33148a06
Author: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
Date: Thu May 16 14:17:56 2013 +0200
zygote: Add support for user namespaces on Linux.
The implementation is done by patching the Zygote host to execute the sandbox
binary with CLONE_NEWUSER and setting the uid and gid mapping so that the child
process is using uid 0 and gid 0 which map to the current user of the parent.
Afterwards, the sandbox will continue as if it was called as a setuid binary.
In addition, this adds new_user_namespace as an option in process_util in order
to set the UID and GID mapping correctly. The reason for this is that just
passing CLONE_NEWUSER to clone_flags doesn't help in LaunchProcess(), because
without setting the mappings exec*() will clear the process's capability sets.
If the kernel doesn't support unprivileged user namespaces and the sandbox
binary doesn't have the setuid flag, the Zygote main process will run without a
sandbox. This is to mimic the behaviour if no SUID sandbox binary path is set.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
diff --git a/base/process/launch.h b/base/process/launch.h
index 45b1053..ce71418 100644
--- a/base/process/launch.h
+++ b/base/process/launch.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct LaunchOptions {
new_process_group(false)
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
, clone_flags(0)
+ , new_user_namespace(false)
#endif // OS_LINUX
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
, ctrl_terminal_fd(-1)
@@ -125,6 +126,9 @@ struct LaunchOptions {
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
// If non-zero, start the process using clone(), using flags as provided.
int clone_flags;
+
+ // If true, start the process in a new user namespace.
+ bool new_user_namespace;
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX)
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
diff --git a/base/process/launch_posix.cc b/base/process/launch_posix.cc
index 52e149c..312f835 100644
--- a/base/process/launch_posix.cc
+++ b/base/process/launch_posix.cc
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@
#include "base/threading/platform_thread.h"
#include "base/threading/thread_restrictions.h"
+#if defined(OS_LINUX)
+#include <sched.h>
+#if !defined(CLONE_NEWUSER)
+#define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000
+#endif
+#endif
+
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#endif
@@ -416,13 +423,23 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector<std::string>& argv,
pid_t pid;
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
- if (options.clone_flags) {
+ int map_pipe_fd[2];
+ int flags = options.clone_flags;
+
+ if (options.new_user_namespace) {
+ flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
+ if (pipe(map_pipe_fd) < 0) {
+ DPLOG(ERROR) << "user namespace pipe";
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (options.clone_flags || options.new_user_namespace) {
// Signal handling in this function assumes the creation of a new
// process, so we check that a thread is not being created by mistake
// and that signal handling follows the process-creation rules.
- RAW_CHECK(
- !(options.clone_flags & (CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM)));
- pid = syscall(__NR_clone, options.clone_flags, 0, 0, 0);
+ RAW_CHECK(!(flags & (CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM)));
+ pid = syscall(__NR_clone, flags, 0, 0, 0);
} else
#endif
{
@@ -440,6 +457,21 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector<std::string>& argv,
} else if (pid == 0) {
// Child process
+#if defined(OS_LINUX)
+ if (options.new_user_namespace) {
+ // Close the write end of the pipe so we get an EOF when the parent closes
+ // the FD. This is to avoid race conditions when the UID/GID mappings are
+ // written _after_ execvp().
+ close(map_pipe_fd[1]);
+
+ char dummy;
+ if (HANDLE_EINTR(read(map_pipe_fd[0], &dummy, 1)) != 0) {
+ RAW_LOG(ERROR, "Unexpected input in uid/gid mapping pipe.");
+ _exit(127);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
// DANGER: fork() rule: in the child, if you don't end up doing exec*(),
// you call _exit() instead of exit(). This is because _exit() does not
// call any previously-registered (in the parent) exit handlers, which
@@ -555,6 +587,40 @@ bool LaunchProcess(const std::vector<std::string>& argv,
_exit(127);
} else {
// Parent process
+#if defined(OS_LINUX)
+ if (options.new_user_namespace) {
+ // We need to write UID/GID mapping here to map the current user outside
+ // the namespace to the root user inside the namespace in order to
+ // correctly "fool" the child process.
+ char buf[256];
+ int map_fd, map_len;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid);
+ map_fd = open(buf, O_RDWR);
+ DPCHECK(map_fd >= 0);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0 %d 1", geteuid());
+ map_len = strlen(buf);
+ if (write(map_fd, buf, map_len) != map_len) {
+ RAW_LOG(WARNING, "Can't write to uid_map.");
+ }
+ close(map_fd);
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%d/gid_map", pid);
+ map_fd = open(buf, O_RDWR);
+ DPCHECK(map_fd >= 0);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0 %d 1", getegid());
+ map_len = strlen(buf);
+ if (write(map_fd, buf, map_len) != map_len) {
+ RAW_LOG(WARNING, "Can't write to gid_map.");
+ }
+ close(map_fd);
+
+ // Close the pipe on the parent, so the child can continue doing the
+ // execvp() call.
+ close(map_pipe_fd[1]);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (options.wait) {
// While this isn't strictly disk IO, waiting for another process to
// finish is the sort of thing ThreadRestrictions is trying to prevent.
diff --git a/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc b/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc
index bb84e62..bce0d18 100644
--- a/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc
+++ b/content/browser/zygote_host/zygote_host_impl_linux.cc
@@ -119,25 +119,31 @@ void ZygoteHostImpl::Init(const std::string& sandbox_cmd) {
sandbox_binary_ = sandbox_cmd.c_str();
- // A non empty sandbox_cmd means we want a SUID sandbox.
- using_suid_sandbox_ = !sandbox_cmd.empty();
+ bool userns_sandbox = false;
+ const std::vector<std::string> cmd_line_unwrapped(cmd_line.argv());
- if (using_suid_sandbox_) {
+ if (!sandbox_cmd.empty()) {
struct stat st;
if (stat(sandbox_binary_.c_str(), &st) != 0) {
LOG(FATAL) << "The SUID sandbox helper binary is missing: "
<< sandbox_binary_ << " Aborting now.";
}
- if (access(sandbox_binary_.c_str(), X_OK) == 0 &&
- (st.st_uid == 0) &&
- (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) &&
- (st.st_mode & S_IXOTH)) {
+ if (access(sandbox_binary_.c_str(), X_OK) == 0) {
+ using_suid_sandbox_ = true;
+
cmd_line.PrependWrapper(sandbox_binary_);
scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient>
sandbox_client(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient::Create());
sandbox_client->SetupLaunchEnvironment();
+
+ if (!((st.st_uid == 0) &&
+ (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) &&
+ (st.st_mode & S_IXOTH))) {
+ userns_sandbox = true;
+ sandbox_client->SetNoSuid();
+ }
} else {
LOG(FATAL) << "The SUID sandbox helper binary was found, but is not "
"configured correctly. Rather than run without sandboxing "
@@ -161,7 +167,19 @@ void ZygoteHostImpl::Init(const std::string& sandbox_cmd) {
base::ProcessHandle process = -1;
base::LaunchOptions options;
options.fds_to_remap = &fds_to_map;
+ if (userns_sandbox)
+ options.new_user_namespace = true;
base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line.argv(), options, &process);
+
+ if (process == -1 && userns_sandbox) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "User namespace sandbox failed to start, running without "
+ << "sandbox! You need at least kernel 3.8.0 with CONFIG_USER_NS "
+ << "enabled in order to use the sandbox without setuid bit.";
+ using_suid_sandbox_ = false;
+ options.new_user_namespace = false;
+ base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line_unwrapped, options, &process);
+ }
+
CHECK(process != -1) << "Failed to launch zygote process";
if (using_suid_sandbox_) {
diff --git a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
index 1f0e9f5..ade5aab 100644
--- a/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
+++ b/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ static bool EnterSandbox(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox,
*has_started_new_init = true;
}
+ // Don't set non-dumpable, as it causes trouble when the host tries to find
+ // the zygote process (XXX: Not quite sure why this happens with user
+ // namespaces). Fortunately, we also have the seccomp filter sandbox which
+ // should disallow the use of ptrace.
+ if (setuid_sandbox->IsNoSuid())
+ return true;
+
#if !defined(OS_OPENBSD)
// Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
// kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc
index 34231d4..36e3201 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.cc
@@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsInNewNETNamespace() const {
return env_->HasVar(kSandboxNETNSEnvironmentVarName);
}
+bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsNoSuid() const {
+ return env_->HasVar(kSandboxNoSuidVarName);
+}
+
bool SetuidSandboxClient::IsSandboxed() const {
return sandboxed_;
}
@@ -175,5 +179,9 @@ void SetuidSandboxClient::SetupLaunchEnvironment() {
SetSandboxAPIEnvironmentVariable(env_);
}
+void SetuidSandboxClient::SetNoSuid() {
+ env_->SetVar(kSandboxNoSuidVarName, "1");
+}
+
} // namespace sandbox
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h
index a9f6536..2e8113a 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ class SetuidSandboxClient {
bool IsInNewPIDNamespace() const;
// Did the setuid helper create a new network namespace ?
bool IsInNewNETNamespace() const;
+ // Is sandboxed without SUID binary ?
+ bool IsNoSuid() const;
// Are we done and fully sandboxed ?
bool IsSandboxed() const;
@@ -46,6 +48,8 @@ class SetuidSandboxClient {
// helper.
void SetupLaunchEnvironment();
+ void SetNoSuid();
+
private:
// Holds the environment. Will never be NULL.
base::Environment* env_;
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
index aad4ff8..bd710d5 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
+++ b/sandbox/linux/suid/common/sandbox.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static const char kAdjustLowMemMarginSwitch[] = "--adjust-low-mem";
static const char kSandboxDescriptorEnvironmentVarName[] = "SBX_D";
static const char kSandboxHelperPidEnvironmentVarName[] = "SBX_HELPER_PID";
+static const char kSandboxNoSuidVarName[] = "SBX_NO_SUID";
static const long kSUIDSandboxApiNumber = 1;
static const char kSandboxEnvironmentApiRequest[] = "SBX_CHROME_API_RQ";

18
pkgs/applications/networking/browsers/chromium/sources.nix
View File

@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
# This file is autogenerated from update.sh in the same directory.
{
dev = {
version = "32.0.1671.3";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-32.0.1671.3.tar.xz";
sha256 = "0bv86ig3mrd95zh78880bcyh9b8w46s7slxq3mwwmrmqp0s8qaq0";
version = "33.0.1712.4";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-33.0.1712.4.tar.xz";
sha256 = "1c1m0y3nnz2lclqi21j6hgqmb46p1hv7c22zz9fn7dax7jkimydk";
};
beta = {
version = "31.0.1650.34";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-31.0.1650.34.tar.xz";
sha256 = "0c73kvp09cmq4x42rcf45v0mnbyb8rcyi5i4pj0pvfn451vbngdq";
version = "32.0.1700.19";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-32.0.1700.19.tar.xz";
sha256 = "0d0kgy160pyg472ka43gxk7n09pqhhs9nd93jyxrp9qsyllfc425";
};
stable = {
version = "30.0.1599.114";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-30.0.1599.114.tar.xz";
sha256 = "0q5pq8bj4y0c7hd121db1fa9g3apkpkhb6cf14ag7abgrda2pzw2";
version = "31.0.1650.57";
url = "http://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-browser-official/chromium-31.0.1650.57.tar.xz";
sha256 = "1xv7frf47hhvqm6f3n2l308yfrs4d8ri70q6pndx7hslhyiixzl9";
};
}