nixos/hardened: make pti=on overridable
Introduces a new security.forcePageTableIsolation option (default false on !hardened, true on hardened) that forces pti=on.
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@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ with lib;
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security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = mkDefault false;
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security.forcePageTableIsolation = mkDefault true;
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security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache = mkDefault "always";
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security.apparmor.enable = mkDefault true;
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@ -42,9 +44,6 @@ with lib;
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# Disable legacy virtual syscalls
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"vsyscall=none"
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# Enable PTI even if CPU claims to be safe from meltdown
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"pti=on"
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];
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boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [
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@ -54,6 +54,18 @@ with lib;
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'';
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};
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security.forcePageTableIsolation = mkOption {
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type = types.bool;
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default = false;
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description = ''
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Whether to force-enable the Page Table Isolation (PTI) Linux kernel
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feature even on CPU models that claim to be safe from Meltdown.
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This hardening feature is most beneficial to systems that run untrusted
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workloads that rely on address space isolation for security.
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'';
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};
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security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache = mkOption {
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type = types.nullOr (types.enum [ "never" "cond" "always" ]);
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default = null;
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@ -114,6 +126,10 @@ with lib;
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boot.kernelParams = [ "nosmt" ];
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})
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(mkIf config.security.forcePageTableIsolation {
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boot.kernelParams = [ "pti=on" ];
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})
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(mkIf (config.security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache != null) {
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boot.kernelParams = [ "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=${config.security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache}" ];
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})
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