Merge pull request #48439 from joachifm/hardened-misc
nixos/security/misc: init
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commit
205aff5a65
@ -149,6 +149,7 @@
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./security/duosec.nix
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./security/hidepid.nix
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./security/lock-kernel-modules.nix
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./security/misc.nix
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./security/oath.nix
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./security/pam.nix
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./security/pam_usb.nix
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@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ with lib;
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security.lockKernelModules = mkDefault true;
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security.allowUserNamespaces = mkDefault false;
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security.apparmor.enable = mkDefault true;
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boot.kernelParams = [
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@ -59,18 +61,6 @@ with lib;
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# ... or at least apply some hardening to it
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boot.kernel.sysctl."net.core.bpf_jit_harden" = mkDefault true;
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# A recurring problem with user namespaces is that there are
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# still code paths where the kernel's permission checking logic
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# fails to account for namespacing, instead permitting a
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# namespaced process to act outside the namespace with the
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# same privileges as it would have inside it. This is particularly
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# bad in the common case of running as root within the namespace.
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#
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# Setting the number of allowed user namespaces to 0 effectively disables
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# the feature at runtime. Attempting to create a user namespace
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# with unshare will then fail with "no space left on device".
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boot.kernel.sysctl."user.max_user_namespaces" = mkDefault 0;
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# Raise ASLR entropy for 64bit & 32bit, respectively.
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#
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# Note: mmap_rnd_compat_bits may not exist on 64bit.
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39
nixos/modules/security/misc.nix
Normal file
39
nixos/modules/security/misc.nix
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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{ config, lib, ... }:
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with lib;
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{
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meta = {
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maintainers = [ maintainers.joachifm ];
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};
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options = {
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security.allowUserNamespaces = mkOption {
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type = types.bool;
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default = true;
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description = ''
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Whether to allow creation of user namespaces. A recurring problem
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with user namespaces is the presence of code paths where the kernel's
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permission checking logic fails to account for namespacing, instead
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permitting a namespaced process to act outside the namespace with the
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same privileges as it would have inside it. This is particularly
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damaging in the common case of running as root within the namespace.
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When user namespace creation is disallowed, attempting to create
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a user namespace fails with "no space left on device" (ENOSPC).
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'';
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};
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};
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config = mkIf (!config.security.allowUserNamespaces) {
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# Setting the number of allowed user namespaces to 0 effectively disables
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# the feature at runtime. Note that root may raise the limit again
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# at any time.
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boot.kernel.sysctl."user.max_user_namespaces" = 0;
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assertions = [
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{ assertion = config.nix.useSandbox -> config.security.allowUserNamespaces;
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message = "`nix.useSandbox = true` conflicts with `!security.allowUserNamespaces`.";
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}
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];
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};
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}
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