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Based on: c950e8a9 config: Fix spec file, add manpages and new GFDL license. With the following patches: configure: Add --disable-programs configure: Add --disable-shared configure: Fix -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 check when CFLAGS contains -Wno-error libcpu: compile i386_lex.c with -Wno-implicit-fallthrough The plan is to stop relying on the distribution's version of elfutils and instead ship our own. This gives us freedom to assume that we're using the latest version and even ship our own patches (starting with a few build system improvements). More details are in scripts/update-elfutils.sh, which was used to generate this commit.
36 lines
1.8 KiB
Plaintext
36 lines
1.8 KiB
Plaintext
# When yama is enabled in the kernel it might be used to filter any user
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# space access which requires PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH like ptrace attach, access
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# to /proc/PID/{mem,personality,stack,syscall}, and the syscalls
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# process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev which are used for interprocess
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# services, communication and introspection (like synchronisation, signaling,
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# debugging, tracing and profiling) of processes.
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#
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# Usage of ptrace attach is restricted by normal user permissions. Normal
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# unprivileged processes cannot interact through ptrace with processes
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# that they cannot send signals to or processes that are running set-uid
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# or set-gid.
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#
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# yama ptrace scope can be used to reduce these permissions even more.
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# This should normally not be done because it will break various programs
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# relying on the default ptrace security restrictions. But can be used
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# if you don't have any other way to separate processes in their own
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# domains. A different way to restrict ptrace is to set the selinux
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# deny_ptrace boolean. Both mechanisms will break some programs relying
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# on the ptrace system call and might force users to elevate their
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# priviliges to root to do their work.
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#
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# For more information see Documentation/security/Yama.txt in the kernel
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# sources. Which also describes the defaults when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
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# is enabled in a kernel build (currently 1 for ptrace_scope).
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#
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# This runtime kernel parameter can be set to the following options:
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# (Note that setting this to anything except zero will break programs!)
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#
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# 0 - Default attach security permissions.
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# 1 - Restricted attach. Only child processes plus normal permissions.
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# 2 - Admin-only attach. Only executables with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
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# 3 - No attach. No process may call ptrace at all. Irrevocable.
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#
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 0
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