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Update on Overleaf.
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@ -518,7 +518,9 @@ Reintroducing networking to a void follows a similar capability-based paradigm t
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Outbound networking is more difficult to re-add to a void than inbound networking. The approach that containerisation solutions such as Docker take is using NAT with bridged adapters by default [CN]. That is, the container is provided an internal IP address that allows access to all networks via the host. Virtual machine solutions take a similar approach, creating bridged Ethernet adapters on the outside network or on a private NAT by default. Each of these approaches give the container/machine the appearance of unbounded outbound access, relying on firewalls to limit this afterwards. This does not fit well with the ethos of creating a void, which is aiming for minimum privilege by default. An ideal solution would provide add in precise network access to the void, rather than adding all access and restricting it in post. This is achieved with inbound sockets by providing the precise and already connected socket to an otherwise empty network namespace, which does not support creating inbound sockets of its own.
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Consideration is given to providing outbound access in the same way as inbound - with statically created and passed sockets. For example, a socket to a database could be specified in the specification, or even one per worker process. The downside of this approach is that the socket lifecycle is still handled by the kernel. While this would work well with UDP sockets, TCP sockets can fail because the remote was closed or because a timeout was hit.
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Consideration is given to providing outbound access in the same way as inbound - with statically created and passed sockets. For example, a socket to a database could be specified in the specification, or even one per worker process. The downside of this approach is that the socket lifecycle is still handled by the kernel. While this would work well with UDP sockets, TCP sockets can fail because the remote was closed or a break in the path caused a timeout to be hit.
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Given that statically giving sockets is infeasible and adding a firewall does not fit well with creating a void, I sought an alternative API. \texttt{pledge(2)} is a system call from OpenBSD which restricts future system calls to an approved set [CN]. This seems like a good fit, though operating outside of the operating system makes the implementation very different. Acceptable sockets can be specified in the application specification, then an interaction socket provided to request various pre-approved sockets from the shim layer. This allows limited access to the host network, approved or denied at request time instead of by a firewall. That is, access to a precisely configured socket can be injected to the void, with a capability to request such sockets and a capability given for the socket.
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\iffalse % disable \section{Language Frontends}
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