diff --git a/report.tex b/report.tex
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--- a/report.tex
+++ b/report.tex
@@ -621,13 +621,13 @@ Void processes mount an empty \texttt{tmpfs} file system in a new namespace, whi
 \section{User namespaces}
 \label{sec:voiding-user}
 
-User namespaces provide isolation of security credentials between processes. They isolate uids, gids, the root directory, keys and capabilities. Rather than the shim being a \texttt{setuid} or \texttt{CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN} binary, it can instead operate with ambient authority. This vastly simplifies the logic for opening file descriptors to pass the child processes, as the shim itself is already operating with correctly limited authority.
+User namespaces provide isolation of security credentials between processes. They isolate uids, gids, the root directory, keys and capabilities. Rather than the shim being a \texttt{setuid} or \texttt{CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN} binary, it can instead operate with ambient authority by utilising user namespaces - vastly simplifying the logic for opening file descriptors to pass child processes, as the shim itself is operating with correctly limited authority.
 
-Similarly to many other namespaces, user namespaces suffer from needing to limit their isolation. For a user namespace to be useful, some relation needs to exist between processes in the user namespace and objects outside. That is, if a process in a user namespace shares a filesystem with a process in the parent namespace, there should be a way to share credentials. To achieve this with user namespaces a mapping between users in the namespace and users outside exists. The most common use-case is to map root in the user namespace to the creating user outside, meaning that a process with full privileges in the namespace will be constrained to the creating user's ambient authority.
+Similarly to many other namespaces, user namespaces suffer from needing to limit their isolation. For a user namespace to be useful, some relation needs to exist between processes in the user namespace and objects outside. That is, if a process in a user namespace shares a filesystem with a process in the parent namespace, there should be a way to share credentials. To achieve this with user namespaces a mapping between users in the namespace and users outside exists. The most common use-case is to map root in the user namespace to the creating user outside, meaning that a process with full privileges in the namespace will be constrained to the creating user's authority.
 
-To create an effective void process content must be written to the files \texttt{/proc/[pid]/uid\_map} and \texttt{/proc/[pid]/gid\_map}. In the case of the shim uid 0 and gid 0 are mapped to the creating user. This is done first such that the remaining stages in creating a void process can have root capabilities within the user namespace - this is not possible prior to writing to these files. Otherwise, \texttt{CLONE\_NEWUSER} combines effectively with other namespace flags, ensuring that the user namespace is created first. This enables the other namespaces to be created without additional permissions.
+To create an effective void process content must be written to the files \texttt{/proc/[pid]/uid\_map} and \texttt{/proc/[pid]/gid\_map}. In the case of the shim uid 0 and gid 0 are mapped to the creating user. This is done first such that the remaining stages in creating a void process can have root capabilities within the user namespace - this is not possible prior to writing to these files. Otherwise, \texttt{CLONE\_NEWUSER} combines effectively with other namespace flags, ensuring that the user namespace is created first. This enables the other namespaces to be created without additional authority.
 
-User namespaces again interact with \texttt{procfs}, which brings up an interesting limitation to the capabilities available in user namespaces. On most systems, \texttt{procfs} has a variety of mounts over parts of it. This might be to interact with a hypervisor such as Xen, to support \texttt{binfmt\_misc} for running special applications, or Docker protecting the host from container mishaps. The series of mounts in a Docker container on one of my machines are shown in Listing \ref{lst:docker-procfs}. The objects mounted over include \texttt{/proc/kcore}, which presents direct access to all of the kernel's allocatable memory. Linux protects these mounts by enforcing that \texttt{procfs} with mounts below it can only be mounted in a new place if the user has root privilege in the init namespace. Fortunately, one can instead bind \texttt{/proc} to the parent namespace before remounting it, which is allowed with mounts below. Further, by running the void process with restricted authority (limited to that of the calling user even as root), the dangerous files in \texttt{/proc} are protected using discretionary access control. This avoids the requirement of adding extra mounts in the void orchestrator.
+User namespaces again interact with \texttt{procfs}, which brings up an interesting limitation to the capabilities available in user namespaces. On most systems, \texttt{procfs} has a variety of mounts over it. This might be to interact with a hypervisor such as Xen, to support \texttt{binfmt\_misc} for running special applications, or Docker protecting the host from container mishaps. The series of mounts in a Docker container on one of my machines are shown in Listing \ref{lst:docker-procfs}. The objects mounted over include \texttt{/proc/kcore}, which presents direct access to all allocatable memory. Linux protects these mounts by enforcing that \texttt{procfs} with mounts below it can only be mounted in a new place if the user has root privilege in the init namespace. One can instead bind \texttt{/proc} to the parent namespace before remounting it, which is permitted with mounts below. Further, by running the void process with constrained authority (limited to that of the calling user even as root), the dangerous files in \texttt{/proc} are protected using discretionary access control. This avoids the requirement of adding extra mounts in the void orchestrator.
 
 \begin{listing}
 \begin{minted}{shell-session}
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ tmpfs /proc/scsi tmpfs ro,relatime 0 0
 \label{lst:docker-procfs}
 \end{listing}
 
-User namespaces act as both a blessing and a curse for security. In the case of Docker, with CVE-2021-21284, a remapped user may be able to alter the initial source of the mappings, causing them to be overridden and gaining root access. In contrast with containerd, with CVE-2021-23021, an always root containerd daemon mounts files that shouldn't be accessible with DAC due to a logic error - mapped user namespaces preserve DAC, preventing such errors.
+In the case of Docker, with CVE-2021-21284, a remapped user may be able to alter the initial source of the mappings, causing them to be overridden and gaining root access, a bug caused by incorrect usage of user namespaces. In contrast with containerd, with CVE-2021-23021, an always root containerd daemon mounts files that shouldn't be accessible with DAC due to a logic error - mapped user namespaces preserve DAC, preventing such errors.
 
 \section{Control group namespaces}
 \label{sec:voiding-cgroup}