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Preparation/preparation.tex

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+\section{Threat Model}
+
+Proxying a network connection via a Remote Portal creates an expanded set of security threats than connecting directly to the Internet via a modem. In this section, I will discuss my analysis of these threats, in both isolation, and compared to the case of connecting directly.
+
+The first focus of this analysis is the transparent security. That is, if the Local Portal is treated as a modem, what security would normally be expected? And for servers communicating with the Remote Portal, what guarantees can they expect of the packets sent and received?
+
+The second focus is the direct interaction between the Local Portal and the Remote Portal. Questions like, does having this system make it easier for someone to perform a Denial of Service attack on the principal?
+
+These security problems will be considered in the context of the success criteria: provide security no worse than not using this solution at all. That is, the security should be identical or stronger than the threats in the first case, and provide no additional vectors of attack in the second.
+
+\subsection{Public Packets}
+
+\subsubsection{Cost}
+
+Many Internet connections have caps or cost for additional bandwidth. In a standard network, the control of your cap is physical, in that, if someone wished to increase the load, 
+
+\subsection{Portal to Portal Communication}
+
+\subsubsection{Authenticity}
+
+Authenticity is a strong requirement for packets transported between the portals. That is, the packet must have both freshness and integrity.